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Conclusion
At the time of his death, Professor Lillich’s manuscript was lacking only a
concluding statement of the contemporary law governing the forcible protection
of nationals abroad. Although we were determined to present his work without
substantive alteration, we did want this volume to be as comprehensive as
possible. An editorial consensus emerged that we should append a chapter as a
complementary snapshot of the law as it exists today. The following article,
written by a co-editor of this volume and originally published in the Dickinson
Law Review in the Spring of 2000, fit the bill. It is reproduced here with the kind
permission of The Dickinson Law School of The Pennsylvania State University.†
We hope that it is an appropriate punctuation mark for Professor Lillich’s
research and analysis, and that it may serve as a point of departure for those
scholars who will build on his impressive body of work
Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
Thomas C. Wingfield
“It was only one life. What is one life in the affairs of a state?”
—Benito Mussolini, after running down a child in his automobile (as reported by Gen.
Smedley D. Butler in address, 1931)1
“This Government wants Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead.”
—Theodore Roosevelt, committing the United States to the protection of Ion
Perdicaris, kidnapped by Sherif Mulai Ahmed ibn-Muhammed er Raisuli (in State
Department telegram, June 22nd, 1904)2
† Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. L. REV. 493 (2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner, The Dickinson School of Law of The
Pennsylvania State University.
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Introduction
As the two epigraphs above demonstrate, perhaps the best criterion for
discriminating tyrannies from democracies is the sincere, proven emphasis
placed upon the value of a single human life. The forcible protection of
nationals abroad, when undertaken by a sovereign for non-pretextual reasons,
is the clearest expression of that distinction in state practice. The academic
challenge in evaluating such uses of force is to distinguish such protection from
other legitimate uses of force, and then to distinguish these uses from other,
illegitimate uses of force. Such an examination is heavily dependent upon the
historical context of the threat, and of the acting state. For, as the Rev. Jesse
Jackson has stated, “a text without a context is a pretext.”3
To properly understand the “text” involved, it is important to have as clear a
definition as possible. Arend and Beck define “protection of nationals” as “the
use of armed force by a state to remove its nationals from another state where
their lives are in actual or imminent peril.”4 Arend and Beck add four qualifica-
tions to this definition. First, consent obviates the analysis, rendering the oper-
ation something other than coercion or intervention.5 Second, the threatened
nationals need not be within the territory of the threatening state, merely
within its exclusive jurisdiction. The classic example of this would be a rescue
from a ship flying the threatening state’s flag.6 Third, a Chapter VII authoriza-
tion would, like consent of the territorial state, obviate the analysis. Assuming
the Security Council is not acting ultra vires, a use of force pursuant to such an
authorization is almost by definition lawful.7 Fourth, and finally, an interven-
tion to protect the citizens of the threatening state is a humanitarian interven-
tion, not the protection of nationals abroad. While the primary discriminator is
the nationality of the victims rescued, the dimensions of the two types of inter-
vention can vary significantly. The use of force in the protection of nationals
abroad is, at its most pure, a rescue operation, lasting no longer than the evacu-
ation itself. Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, can involve
lengthy nation-building or even government-replacement in the territorial
state.8 A lengthier, but more precise, definition would then read: “the use or
threat of imminent use of armed force by a state to safeguard, and usually re-
move, its nationals from the territory or exclusive jurisdiction of another state,
without the consent of that state or the authorization of the UN Security
Council, where the lives of those nationals are in actual or imminent peril.”
This article will briefly examine the historical foundation for the forcible
protection of nationals abroad, recount a number of post-Charter uses of force
Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
230
T:\Academic\Blue Book\Lillich\Ventura Files\Lillich Blue Book Vol 77.vp
Monday, July 29, 2002 10:55:07 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
to protect nationals, describe and evaluate alternate modern theories support-
ing such actions, and conclude with a description of the law today.
Historical Development
While an exhaustive historical review of the legality of the use of force in the
protection of nationals could consume several volumes, the views of three pub-
licists provide a firm basis for the subsequent, principally post-Charter analysis.
Vattel wrote what is perhaps the seminal paragraph on the protection of
nationals:
Whoever offends the State, injures its rights, disturbs its tranquility, or does it a
prejudice in any manner whatsoever, declares himself its enemy, and exposes
himself to be justly punished for it. Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends
the State, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter
should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to
make full reparation; since otherwise the citizen would not obtain the great end
of the civil association, which is, safety.9
The justification for intervention in such a case is more than just a right; it
becomes a duty of the sovereign. The duty, however, is tempered by a respect
for the sovereignty of other nations:
The prince . . . ought not to interfere in the causes of his subjects in foreign
countries, and grant them protection, excepting in cases where justice is refused,
or palpable and evident injustice done, or rules and forms openly violated, or,
finally, an odious distinction made, to the prejudice of his subjects, or of
foreigners in general.10
This duty, and this tension, has been echoed by all subsequent thoughtful
commentators.
Hall, writing at the end of the 19th Century, returned to the fundamental
nature of this duty: “At the root of state life lies the circumstance that the
bond which exists between a state and its subjects is not severed when the
latter issue from the national territory.”11 However, Hall adds with British
understatement, “the clashing laws of states of European civilization still
place many persons in situations that are frequently difficult and occasionally
serious.”12 It is at this point that the sovereign’s duty to protect his subject
emerges:
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The duty of protection is correlative to the rights of a sovereign over his subjects;
the maintenance of the bond between a state and its subjects while they are
abroad implies that the former must watch over and protect them with in the due
limit of the rights of other states. ... It enables governments to exact reparation
for oppression they have suffered, or for injuries done to them otherwise than by
process of law; and it gives the means of guarding them against the effect of
unreasonable laws, laws totally out of harmony with the nature and degree of
civilization by which a foreign power affects to be characterized, and finally of an
administration of laws bad beyond a certain point. When in these directions a
state grossly fails in its duties; when it is either incapable of ruling, or rules with
patent injustice, the right of protection emerges in the form of diplomatic
remonstrance, and in extreme cases of ulterior measures.13
The nature and extent of these “ulterior measures” were principally a British
concern in the 19th Century, but became an American concern early in the 20th
Century, as the United States Navy and Marine Corps extended America’s
ability to respond to “laws bad beyond a certain point.”
Borchard, an American writing early in the 20th Century, addresses with
textbook matter-of-factness the use of such force in the protection of nationals
abroad:
The display of force and the threat to use it . . . have frequently proved an
effective means of obtaining redress . . . . This display of force usually takes the
form of a national war-ship appearing before the port of the foreign country
alleged to be in default. The moral influence exerted by the presence of a war
vessel is great, and . . . in quarters of the world subject to frequent domestic
disorder has served not only to prevent an abuse of aliens’ rights, particularly of
the nationals of the country to which the vessel belongs.14
Although such displays were frequently effective, they occasionally escalated
to actual uses of force:
The army or navy has frequently been used for the protection of citizens or their
property in foreign countries in cases of emergency where the local government
has failed, through inability or unwillingness, to afford adequate protection to
the persons or property of the foreigners in question.15 . . . The occasions on
which troops have been landed have varied, although it has always been under
circumstances where the protective faculties of the local government have been
so weakened that the security of aliens, particularly nationals of the interfering
state, seemed so precarious that some measure of self-help was deemed
necessary.16 . . . While the landing of troops in the cases above mentioned has
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been purely protective, they have not always been able to avoid belligerent
operations to effect their purpose.17
Vattel, Hall, and Borchard describe a legal regime which existed from the
early 17th Century until the middle of the 20th Century. It was only with the en-
try into force of the U.N. Charter that an entirely new analytical framework
was put into place, ostensibly outlawing the aggressive use of force, but preserv-
ing the “inherent” right of self-defense. Although centuries of state practice
were not entirely irrelevant, future uses of force to protect nationals abroad
would have to be justified within the new Charter paradigm.
The first step in understanding this new framework is to review the signifi-
cant uses of force in the Charter era (post-1945), providing the factual back-
ground for testing theory and examining state practice.
Uses of Force in the Charter Era
United Kingdom Threatens Intervention in Iran—1946
When rioting broke out in Iran in the summer of 1946, less than a year after the
Charter had entered into force, the British government was concerned for the
safety of British residents working for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. With
the permission of the Iraqi government,18 Britain dispatched a contingent of
troops to Basra, Iraq, near the Iranian border. The U.K. also ordered two
warships to anchor off Basra. They did this “in order that they may be at hand
for the protection, should the circumstances demand it, of Indian, British and
Arab lives, and in order to safeguard Indian and British interests in South
Persia, troops are being sent from India to Basra.”19 The rioting subsided, and
no entry was necessary. The Iranian government still protested the threat of
force as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and an infringement of
Iranian sovereignty.20 Britain responded that it would have intervened in case
of a “grave emergency,”21 that is, if the Iranian government had been unable or
unwilling to protect the lives of British residents.
Second Threat of Intervention in Iran by U.K.—1951
The Iranian government precipitated another crisis when it nationalized the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. The British government once again
feared that the heightened tensions between the two countries might put
British residents in Iran at risk. Accordingly, the U.K. dispatched several
warships to Iraqi waters, and deployed a number of combat aircraft to British
bases within Iraq.22 British policy statements on the move were unusually clear
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and to the point. Foreign Secretary Morrison stated that Britain had “every
right and indeed the duty to protect British lives.”23 He went on to elaborate
before the House of Commons:
As I have repeatedly informed the House, His Majesty’s government are not
prepared to stand idly by if the lives of British nationals are in jeopardy. It is the
responsibility of the Persian government to see to it that law and order are
maintained and that all within the frontiers of Persia are protected from
violence. If, however, that responsibility were not met it would equally be the
right and duty of His Majesty’s government to extend protection to its own
nationals.24
Iran, on the other hand, saw the positioning of air and naval forces just outside
its own borders as a threat of force unwarranted by the situation. Iran stated
that the U.K. had no right to “intimidate” Iran,25 and that Iran was “completely
the master of the situation.”26 Iran took this policy position one step further,
and declared before a meeting of the Sixth Committee of the UN General
Assembly that even if British nationals had been mistreated, any action to
intervene and protect them could not be justified as a lawful exercise of
self-defense.27
The Cairo Riots—1952
A more subtle response to a more serious threat occurred in January, 1952,
when large-scale rioting broke out in Cairo. This time, British property was
damaged and British lives were lost.28 In response, the U.K. developed a
contingency plan to use its troops in the Suez Canal zone to move in to Cairo
and Alexandria to protect endangered British residents.29 The British
government communicated its willingness to take action in a diplomatic note
on January 27th, stating that it held the government of Egypt fully responsible
for all damage to British property and any threat to the safety of British
residents in Egypt. Further, the note warned, the U.K. reserved the right to
take whatever action was required to safeguard the lives and property of its
nationals.30 The note had the desired effect, and the previously quiescent
Egyptian army moved in to put down the rioters. Then-Foreign Secretary Eden
explained, “the belief that we had the forces and the conviction that we were
prepared to use them were powerful arguments in prodding the Egyptian army
to quell the riots.”31
Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
234
T:\Academic\Blue Book\Lillich\Ventura Files\Lillich Blue Book Vol 77.vp
Monday, July 29, 2002 10:55:09 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Anglo-French Intervention in Egypt in 1956 (the Suez Crisis)
Fearing that their nationals were threatened by Israeli-Egyptian war in
October, 1956, Britain and France made a series of diplomatic entreaties for
the belligerents to cease hostilities. When this course failed, the British and the
French bombed Egyptian airstrips near the Suez Canal and, four days later,
inserted a contingent of troops to occupy key points along the canal. While
France emphasized other rationales, Britain relied heavily on the right to
protect its own citizens abroad.32 The British Representative to the UN,
speaking before the Security Council, said:
In Egypt there are many thousands of British and French nationals. The chain of
events which began with the Israel [sic] moves into Egypt has developed into
hostilities and hostilities have created a disturbed situation. In those
circumstances, British and French lives must be safeguarded. I again emphasize
. . . that we should certainly not want to keep any forces in the area for one
moment longer than is necessary to protect our nationals.33
Then-Prime Minister Eden stated before the House of Commons that “there is
nothing . . . in the Charter which abrogates the right of a Government to take
such steps as are essential to protect the lives of their citizens.”34 He went on to
explain that, when the Security Council was paralyzed by a veto (as it was in
this case), that states had the right to intervene “in an emergency,” to protect
the lives of nationals abroad.35 He added that this right was based on the
inherent Article 51 right to self-defense,36 and that this right could be exercised
anticipatorily—that is, the injured state need not first receive the equivalent of
an armed attack against its citizens before moving preemptively against the
threat.37
Foreign Secretary Lloyd outlined three criteria for the lawful exercise of the
right of protection of nationals abroad within the larger right of self-defense:
first, that the nationals of the intervening state be under “an imminent threat
of injury;” second, that there is a “failure or inability” by the local sovereign to
protect foreign citizens; and third, that the action of the intervening state be
“strictly confined to the object of protecting the nationals against injury.”38
Finally, the Lord Chancellor, before the House of Lords, stated that “self-
defence undoubtedly includes a situation in which the lives of a State’s nationals
abroad are threatened and it is necessary to intervene on that territory for their
protection.”39
In addition to this rationale, the British and the French also pursued the mil-
itary operation to maintain international freedom of navigation through the
Conclusion
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canal, and to stop hostilities between Egypt and Israel.40 The problem of over-
lapping justifications will reappear frequently in state practice.
The Belgian Intervention in the Congo—1960
Immediately upon declaring its independence from Belgium in July 1960, the
Congo’s army mutinied and touched off a week of rioting, looting, and
atrocities against foreign nationals.41 As the Congolese government was
completely unable to maintain order, Belgium ordered a contingent of
paratroopers already in the Congo to protect Belgian and other threatened
foreign nationals.42 Before the Security Council, the Belgian Ambassador to
the UN stated that his government had “decided to intervene with the sole
purpose of ensuring the safety of European and other members of the
population and of protecting human lives in general.”43 This rationale mixes
pure self-defense (protecting a state’s own nationals), collective self-defense
(protecting other foreign nationals within another state), and humanitarian
intervention (protecting the citizens of the threatened state).
In Security Council debate, France argued that the Belgian troops’ “mission
of protecting lives and property is the direct result of the failure of the Congo-
lese authorities and is in accord with a recognized principle of international
law, namely, intervention on humanitarian grounds.”44 Argentina based its
support of the Belgian intervention not on the legality of self-defense, but on
the moral imperative of the situation:
Now, we are convinced that the protection of the life and honour of individuals
is a sacred duty to which all other considerations must yield. We cannot reproach
the Belgian government for having assumed this duty when Belgian nationals
were in danger. Any other State would have done the same thing.45
The United States was more guarded in its statements, and urged that Bel-
gium should withdraw once the UN had provided military forces to stabilize the
situation. In an interesting gloss on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention,
Belgium actually adopted the U.S. position in a statement that is a model of
concise legal advocacy: Belgium would withdraw “its intervening troops as
soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations ensures the maintenance of
order and the safety of persons.”46
United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic—1965
In April, 1965, the Constitutional Party forced the resignation of Dominican
President Reid Cabral. Cabral’s National Reconstruction Government
Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
236
T:\Academic\Blue Book\Lillich\Ventura Files\Lillich Blue Book Vol 77.vp
Monday, July 29, 2002 10:55:09 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
immediately organized to regain control of the country. By the end of the
month, the situation was sufficiently out of hand that the United States felt
compelled to land 400 Marines to evacuate American citizens and other
foreign nationals from the country.47 According to U.S. Ambassador to the UN
Adlai Stevenson,
In the absence of any governmental authority, Dominican law enforcement and
military officials informed our Embassy that the situation was completely out of
control, that the police and the Government could no longer give any guarantee
concerning the safety of Americans or of any foreign nationals, and that only an
immediate landing of United States forces could safeguard and protect the lives
of thousands of Americans and thousands of citizens of some thirty other
countries.48
This introduces a hybrid form of invitation—less than the pure consent
rendered by an invitation from the de jure sovereign, but more than a simple,
unilateral decision to intervene based on an external analysis of the situation.
The warnings and requests of mid-to-high level officials of the defeated but
arguably still lawful government fall squarely within this gray area. While this
type of request does not forestall a legal analysis of the grounds for intervening
(as would an invitation from the sovereign), it does add weight to the factual
arguments establishing the state of chaos in a country, and therefore helps
weed out instances of purely pretextual intervention.
However valid the basis for forcible protection of nationals may have been at
the outset, U.S. involvement quickly escalated and policy diversified. The
number of troops increased, their stay in-country was extended, and subse-
quent government statements announced that the United States was acting to
prevent the establishment of a second communist government in the Western
Hemisphere.49 To no one’s surprise, Britain supported the initial deployment,
France was ambivalent, and Cuba was opposed.50
The Mayaguez Incident—1975
On May 12th, 1975, Cambodia seized an American merchant ship. Cambodia
claimed the Mayaguez was in its territorial waters, and on a spy mission. The
United States insisted that the ship had been in international waters at the
time of its seizure, and that it had not been on a spy mission. On May 13th, the
U.S. demanded she be released within 24 hours. Cambodia did not comply, so
the United States launched an airstrike against the facility at which it was
being held. The Cambodians still did not comply, so on May 14th, the U.S.
Conclusion
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mounted a heliborne Marine infantry assault against the ship. This did achieve
the desired result, and the ship and crew were freed.51
Between the airstrike on the 13th and the assault on the 14th, the U.S. re-
quested the assistance of the Secretary General of the UN in securing the re-
lease of the ship. In the request, the U.S. reserved the right to take “such
measures as may be necessary to protect the lives of American citizens and
property, including appropriate measures of self-defense under Article 51 of
the UN Charter.”52
Cambodia condemned the assault, claiming it was “a brutal act of aggres-
sion.”53 Cambodia also stated that the attack was not militarily necessary, in
that it had already begun preparations to release the ship.54 China sided with
Cambodia, labeling the assault an “act of piracy.”55 Algeria and Thailand also
condemned the attack, the latter because its bases had been used as a staging
area for the assault team.56
The Evacuation of U.S. Citizens from Lebanon—1976
When the long-running civil war in Lebanon reached a threshold threatening
the lives of the few Americans remaining in the country, the United States
evacuated a small group to a warship on June 28th, 1976, and again on July
27th.57 Interestingly, the U.S. consulted no domestic authority before the first
evacuation, but pursued a different course before the second. Instead of
requesting the approval of the de jure Lebanese government, whose influence
over events asymptotically approached irrelevance, the U.S. coordinated with
those actually in control of the territory—the PLO and several other
Palestinian groups.58 While this coordination, like that with the Dominican
quasi-authorities eleven years earlier—had little influence on the academic
legality of the operation, it did provide an improved chance of conducting the
operation with as few casualties as possible. In this case, no U.S. servicemen or
Lebanese civilians were killed.59
The Israeli Raid on Entebbe—1976
On June 27th, 1976, a French airliner enroute from Tel Aviv to Paris was
hijacked by four Palestinian terrorists. After a brief stop in Libya, the aircraft
flew to Uganda, where it was joined by six additional terrorists. The terrorists
freed all of the non-Israeli passengers, and specifically threatened the lives of
those who remained. The government of Uganda was at best uncooperative in
attempts to negotiate a settlement, and appeared to be providing support to the
terrorists.60
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The evening of July 3rd and 4th, Israeli commandos stormed the main termi-
nal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Killed were all of the terrorists who were
holding 96 Israelis hostage, along with several hostages who stood up in the
middle of the melee, a number of Ugandan soldiers, and one Israeli commando.
To prevent pursuit, the Israelis also destroyed the operational Ugandan fighters
(approximately 10) on the tarmac.61
The unique aspect of this raid was that the nationals in question were taken
to the foreign country against their will.62 This suggests that the foreign nation-
als concerned were less responsible for weighing the risks involved in travelling
to and living in the dangerous country in question. It is also more difficult for
the intervening state to fashion a pretext in the rush of a terrorist event than
over the course of a long-deteriorating civil situation. Finally, the actions re-
quired to rescue people in a confined hostage setting are necessarily less intru-
sive than to secure an area with a foreign capital against riots. These three
reasons appear to make intervention in the case of a terrorist event less prob-
lematic than even traditional protection of nationals abroad.
Israel made a forceful case for its rescue mission at a meeting of the Security
Council on July 9th. It claimed that it had the right “to take military action to
protect its nationals in mortal danger.”63 This right, Israel claimed, was based
on the inherent right of self-defense, “enshrined in international law and the
Charter of the United Nations,” and supported by state practice.64 Israel stated
that this exercise of self-defense met the standard of the Caroline case: “Neces-
sity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation.”65 Finally, Israel explained that the use of force was
not directed at Uganda per se, and employed only as much force as was neces-
sary to secure and extract its nationals.66
The United States was the only country to make a clear statement support-
ing the legality of the Israeli raid. At the same Security Council meeting, the
U.S. first stated that the intervention was “a temporary breach of the territorial
integrity of Uganda.”67 While this sort of breach is normally considered a viola-
tion of the UN Charter, this case, the U.S. argued, fit within an exception.
“There is a well-established right,” said the U.S., “to use limited force for the
protection of one’s own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in
a situation where the State in whose territory they are located is either unwill-
ing or unable to protect them.”68 The U.S. stated that this right flows from the
inherent right of self-defense and allows “necessary and appropriate” force to
protect a nation’s own citizens.69 By these criteria, the U.S. concluded, the raid
on Entebbe was a lawful use of force under international law. The U.S. found
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the force used to be proportional to the limited goal of freeing the passengers,
and the use of force had ended once this goal had been achieved.70
France also supported the Israeli intervention, in a manner of speaking.
While stating that “at first sight . . . the surprise attack by an armed force on a
foreign airport for the purpose of achieving by violence an objective” appeared
to violate international law, the Israeli action had not been designed to infringe
the territorial integrity or political independence of Uganda, but merely to save
lives.71 The French brought up an additional legal point, that the UN General
Assembly’s Resolution on the Definition of Aggression listed acts which were
only prima facie evidence of acts of aggression, and that it was up to the Security
Council to determine if, “in the light of other relevant circumstances,” aggres-
sion had actually been committed.72
The French Threat to Intervene in the Western Sahara—1978
On October 25th, 1978, two French technicians were captured in Mauritania
by Polisario guerillas. Two days later, the French Defense Minister refused to
rule out a military raid to free them. A French parachute corps was moved to
Senegal, and French aircraft participated in airstrikes on Polisario military
formations on December 12th, 13th, and 18th. On December 23rd, the two
technicians were turned over to the UN Secretary General in Algeria.73
Although the force was not applied in the form of a rescue mission, its indirect
application had the desired result.
The Egyptian Raid on Larnaca—1978
The first non-Western use of force to protect nationals abroad was, at best, a
learning experience for all involved. Egypt sent a planeful of commandos to
Larnaca, Cyprus, on February, 19th to free Egyptian and other hostages taken
the day before. Although the Egyptians received permission to land, they did
not receive permission to storm the aircraft. The Cypriot authorities were
successfully concluding negotiations with the terrorists, and the passengers had
begun to leave the aircraft, when the Egyptians decided to attack. The Cypriot
military opened fire on the Egyptians, arrested the terrorists, and helped the
hostages to safety.74
The Egyptians defended their actions less as the protection of nationals
abroad (although several of the hostages were Egyptian, and an Egyptian had
been killed by the terrorists in the initial seizure of the hostages), and more as
an amorphous commitment “to fight terrorism and to bring all those who use
such methods to justice.”75
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The U.S. Hostage Rescue Attempt in Iran—1980
On the evening of 24-25 April, 1980, the United States launched a commando
raid into Iran to rescue 50 hostages who had been held since November 4th of
the previous year. The raid ultimately failed due to weather, equipment
malfunction, and bad luck.
Although the hostage incident preoccupied the United States from late
1979 to early 1981, and was responsible for an enormous amount of diplomatic
maneuvering, the specific question of using force in the protection of nationals
abroad was fairly straightforward. The ICJ decision in the hostages case, ren-
dered on May 24th, characterized the actions of the “students” holding the hos-
tages as fairly educible to the Iranian government: “[T]he approval given to
these nacts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State,
and the decision to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the
Embassy and detention of the hostages into acts of that State.”76 This retro-
spective linking of the “students” actions to the Iranian State permitted action
against that state as though it had perpetrated those actions in the first place.
President Carter stated:
I ordered this rescue mission prepared in order to safeguard American lives,
to protect America’s national interests, and to reduce the tensions in the world
that have been caused among many nations as the crisis continued. . . . The
mission . . . was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was
not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of
hostility toward Iran or its people.77
In his report to Congress, he declared: “In carrying out this operation, the
United States was acting wholly within its right, in accordance with Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where the
government of the territory in which they are located is unwilling or unable to
protect them.”78
While usual countries supported or condemned the raid in political terms,
the Italian Foreign Minister Colombo, echoing Reisman, provided an illumi-
nating legal comment:
There was . . . on the part of Iran alone an extremely serious infringement of the
rules of international law. The State which falls a victim to such an infringement
has the power, under international law, to resort to self-help. Even the United
Nations Charter recognizes this right as inherent, the exercise of which is
subordinate to the powers and duties conferred on the Security Council, for
restoring the rule of law. But the Charter also recognizes the right of each
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permanent member of the Security Council to veto. Each permanent member
must be aware of the responsibility it takes upon itself when vetoing a resolution
of the Security Council, by pointing the way to self-help.79
U.S. Intervention in Grenada—1983
On October 25th, 1983, the U.S. launched Operation Urgent Fury, a large
amphibious and air assault on the island nation of Grenada. This was in
response to an increasingly anarchic situation, precipitated earlier in the
month by a coup d’etat against the island’s Marxist Prime Minister, Maurice
Bishop, by hard-line members of his own government. On October 19th, Bishop
and scores of others were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to regain control of
the island’s government. Later that same day, General Hudson Austin, head of
the new “Revolutionary Military Council,” announced a four-day, 24-hour,
shoot-on-sight curfew. Concerned for the safety of American tourists and
medical students on the island, and alarmed by the presence of a large number
of armed, Cuban paramilitary construction workers on the island (completing
work on an airstrip large enough to support heavy military aircraft), the United
States took action.80
Although the Grenadian operation appeared to have the classic factual
predicate for a traditional forcible protection of nationals scenario, it was not
for two specific reasons. First, the operation was conducted at the request of
the Governor-General of Grenada, whose constitutional authority, particularly
in the absence of any other de jure government, was unsurpassed by any other
claimant to power.81 Second, the operation was a textbook example of collec-
tive self-defense, in that the United States’ assistance was forcefully and ur-
gently requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.82 Despite
the fact that there appear to be three independently sufficient legal justifica-
tions for the U.S./OECS intervention, 79 governments expressed some level of
disapproval of the operation, and on November 2nd, the UN General Assembly
voted 108 to 9 to condemn the intervention as a “violation of international
law.”83 This was somewhat offset by the overwhelming support for the opera-
tion shown by the people of Grenada.84
The U.S. Intervention in Panama—1989
Six years later, another small nation in the Western Hemisphere had had its
democratic election invalidated by a military strongman, and the latent threat
to local citizens and foreign nationals gradually escalated to unacceptable
levels. As Arend and Beck describe:
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On December 20, 1989, the United States launched an invasion of Panama
code-named Operation ‘Just Cause.’ In a special press briefing given that day,
Secretary of State James Baker emphasized that the ‘leading objective’ of the US
military action had been ‘to protect American lives.’ [footnote omitted] Earlier
on D-Day, President Bush had tersely explained the rationale for his decision to
use force: ‘Last Friday, [General Manuel] Noriega declared his military
dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly
threatened the lives of Americans in Panama.’ On Saturday, ‘forces under his
command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman, wounded another,
arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman and then brutally
interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That, said the president,
‘was enough!’ [footnote omitted] It was time to act.85
Two factors make the analysis of the intervention more difficult. First is the
sheer scale of the operation: ten thousand American troops eventually seized
control of the entire country, removed the de facto head of state to face drug
trafficking charges in the U.S., and reinstalled the de jure, democratically-
elected government.86 Second, President Bush cited four overlapping justifica-
tions for the intervention: “to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend de-
mocracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the integrity of
the Panama Canal Treaty.”87 Of these, claimed Secretary of State Baker, the
protection of American lives was “the leading one.”88
Reaction to the invasion was generally negative—mildly so in Europe, and
stridently so in Latin America.89 The communist world was also condemna-
tory, with the Soviet Union calling the operation “a violation of the United Na-
tions Charter and of the universally accepted norms of behavior between
sovereign states.”90 China simply labeled it “a violation of internal law.”91 The
United States, Britain, and France vetoed a Security Council resolution con-
demning the invasion.92
The U.S. Intervention in Liberia—1990
On August 5th, 1990, the United States landed 255 Marines in the Liberian
capital of Monrovia to evacuate U.S. and any other nationals desiring to leave
the country. This was in immediate response to an announcement the day
before by rebel leader Prince Johnson, who called for the arrest of all foreign
nationals in the capital. Johnson apparently wished to attract international
attention to his rebel faction, and provoke an international response to the
seven-month-old rebellion.93 In this, he was successful.
Without seeking or receiving permission from embattled President Samuel
K. Doe or either of the rival rebel faction leaders, the Marines evacuated
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approximately one thousand foreign nationals from Monrovia over a two-week
period.94 On August 24th, a West African peacekeeping force arrived in
Monrovia to enforce a cease-fire.95
Professor Lillich drew this conclusion from the international community’s
reaction to the evacuation:
[T]he renewed assertion by the United States of the right of forcible protection
of its nationals during the Liberian disorder, the fact that hundreds of other
foreign nationals from dozens of States were evacuated with what must have
been the enthusiastic (if not explicit) approval of their governments, and the
near-complete absence of legal or other criticism of the rescue operation all
combine to indicate that the international community, now more than ever in
the post-Cold War period, is prepared to accept, endorse or, at the very least,
tolerate the forcible protection of nationals abroad in appropriate cases.96
Theoretical Bases for Action
The two major theories addressing the legality of the use of force in the
protection of nationals abroad are the “restrictionist” theory, which views any
such use of force as unlawful, and the “counter-restrictionist theory,” which, as
its name implies, holds the opposite view. Within the counter-restrictionist
theory, there are several intermingled sub-theories supporting the general
premise of allowing intervention.
The Restrictionist Theory
This theory, which states that there is no lawful basis for the forcible protection
of nationals abroad, rests on three assumptions. First, it assumes that the sole
principal goal of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace
and security. Second, it holds that the UN has a monopoly on the lawful use of
force, with the narrow exception for self-defense in the case of armed attack on
the territory of a state. Third, it maintains that if states were permitted to use
force to protect their nationals abroad, or for any other reason beyond clear
individual or collective self-defense, they would broaden this narrow mandate,
using it as a pretext for any desired policy ends.97
Restrictionists concede that, under the pre-Charter legal regime, states did
have the right to use force unilaterally in the protection of their nationals.
However, they say, this right was often abused, placing weak states at the mercy
of stronger ones wishing to advance national policy through violence. To end
this practice, they conclude, the framers of the UN Charter specifically out-
lawed the unilateral use of force, except for the most obvious cases of national
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self-defense against armed attack, and then only to the extent that the Security
Council had not yet acted. According to Ian Brownlie, “[t]he whole object of
the Charter was to render unilateral use of force, even in self-defense, subject
to UN control.”98
Arend and Beck concisely summarize the textual basis for the restrictionist
argument:
For their rendition of the jus ad bellum, the restrictionists draw heavily upon
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. In their view, the language of Article
2(4) clearly indicates a general prohibition on the use of force by states. [footnote
omitted] No state is permitted to threaten or use force ‘against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.’ Article 51, which provides for
‘individual and collective self-defense,’ constitutes merely a narrow exception to
the general prohibition of 2(4). [footnote omitted] States may defend
themselves, restrictionists argue, but only after an actual ‘armed attack’ upon
state territory has occurred. [footnote omitted] Typical of the restrictionist view
is that described by Waldcock, himself a counter-restrictionist: ‘2(4) prohibits
entirely any threat of use of armed force between independent States except in
individual or collective self defense under Article 51 or in execution of collective
measures under the Charter for maintaining or restoring peace.’ [footnote
omitted] The UN Charter’s prohibition, the French restrictionist Viraly
suggests, has the broadest range it is possible to imagine.’ [footnote omitted]99
The restrictionist theory, in its purest form, allows no use of force against any
terrorist or other groups who are using force below the invasion-level of an ar-
mored column crossing a national border.
The Counter-Restrictionist Theory
The counter-restrictionist theory is actually a constellation of four overlapping,
nonexclusive subtheories.
The first subtheory involves the survival or revival of the pre-Charter cus-
tomary rule allowing forcible protection of nationals abroad. Derek Bowett ar-
gues for the survival of the customary rule. He believes that a reading of the
Charter’s travaux preparatoires shows that the framers intended to preserve the
“inherent” right of self-defense, with the contours acquired from customary in-
ternational law up to that point. More persuasively for Bowett, state practice
since the Charter was ratified has confirmed that a significant number of states
have exercised the right to protect nationals abroad, extending the customary
international law norm into the present.100
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The other version of this subtheory holds that the norm has been revived in
the modern era. Arend and Beck explain:
In their view, the UN founders mistakenly assumed that ‘self-help’ would no
longer be necessary ‘since an authoritative international organization [could
now] provide the police facilities for enforcement of international rights.
[footnote omitted] Unfortunately for the international system, submit Michael
Reisman, Richard Lillich, and other scholars, the UN enforcement mechanisms
have been confounded at virtually every turn by dissension among the Security
Council’s permanent membership. [footnote omitted] Article 2(4)’s prohibition
on the threat or use of force, they assert, must hence be conditioned on the
United Nations’ capacity to respond effectively. When the UN fails to do so,
customary law revives and states may intervene to protect nationals. [footnote
omitted]101
In summary, this subtheory posits that, whether it survived the entry into
force of the Charter, or was extinguished by it and later revived by UN mal-,
mis-, or nonfeasance, the customary norm under international law permitting
the use of force in the protection of nationals abroad is alive today.102
The second subtheory describes the protection of nationals abroad as a per-
missible use of force below the Article 2(4) threshold. The article itself directs:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any way inconsistent with the UN’s purposes.”103 Here, the key is
that Article 2(4) has two dimensions: a quantitative aspect regarding the
amount of violence or coercion, and a qualitative aspect regarding the end to
which the violence or coercion is directed. An oversimplified reading of Article
2(4) may leave the impression of a simple, and low, threshold, forbidding all
uses or even threats of force not flowing from self-defense or Chapter VII
authorization. The two-dimensional approach, however, keys on the language
“. . . against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . . .”
A legitimate use of force in the protection of nationals abroad does not take or
hold territory, or threaten the government elected, or tolerated, by the people.
Such a use of force is qualitatively different, and not the type which the framers
of the Charter, with fresh memories of German and Japanese aggression,
sought to circumscribe. A brief operation which, at its conclusion, has affected
neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the threaten-
ing state would not appear to have violated the qualitative prong of the Article
2(4) prohibition.104
Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad
246
T:\Academic\Blue Book\Lillich\Ventura Files\Lillich Blue Book Vol 77.vp
Monday, July 29, 2002 10:55:13 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
The third subtheory is a complement of the second; it holds that a threat to
even a single national abroad is the equivalent of an “armed attack” against the
nation, allowing for a protective, and not punitive, response proportional to
the injury received or threatened. That is, the forcible protection of nationals
abroad is permissible self-defense under Article 51.105 Since Article 51 appears
not to create, but to simply recognize, “the inherent right of self-defense,” counter-
restrictionists believe the Charter provides “a local habitation and a name” for
the customary right of the first subtheory. The problem with this subtheory ap-
pears to be that, like Article 2(4), Article 51 has both qualitative and quantita-
tive aspects. The former fits well with the first subtheory, in that an “inherent”
right could quite plausibly follow the contours of customary international law.
The latter, however, suggests that there is a high threshold, “armed attack,” be-
low which the use of force is inappropriate.
The counterargument to this last point is that it is difficult to imagine that
the framers of the Charter would create a legal no-man’s land, wherein a rogue
state would be able to inflict violent injury, but the aggrieved state would not
be able to respond in self-defense.106 The key to reconciling this apparent
lacuna is proportionality: self-defense operates across the spectrum of violence,
and a small “armed attack” against a national abroad may be met with a neces-
sary and proportional nonpunitive response designed to protect the victim
from further harm. To the extent that Article 51 permits reaction against
less-than-overwhelming uses of force, it demands a reciprocal limitation on the
scope, duration, and intensity of the protective response. The customary inter-
national legal doctrines comprising the law of armed conflict—military neces-
sity, proportionality, and chivalry—provide these limitations even in the
absence of an absolute prohibition by Article 51.
Finally, the fourth subtheory is grounded in a respect for human rights. Spe-
cifically, McDougal and Reisman reject the restrictionist premise that the UN
has one overriding purpose, the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity. They argue that the UN has two such fundamental premises, each deserv-
ing equal weight: the maintenance of international peace and security, and the
protection of human rights.107
This view is grounded in the Preamble, Articles 1, 55, and 56, and a large
and growing corpus of human rights law.108 Under this view, human rights vio-
lations are themselves threats to international peace and security. If the Secu-
rity Council fails to act under Chapter VII, McDougal and Reisman argue, “the
cumulative effect of articles 1, 55, and 56 [would be] to establish the legality of
unilateral self-help.”109
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Conclusion
This article defined forcible protection of nationals abroad, reviewed
commentary on the concept by publicists from the late 18th Century to the end
of the pre-Charter era, and then surveyed the major uses of force in the
protection of nationals abroad during the Charter era.
Lessons of State Practice
Arend and Beck provide an outstanding structural review of state practice in
the Charter era. They examine four broad areas—the nature of intervening
states, the circumstances of intervention, the scope of intervention, and state
justification for intervention—and explore subcriteria within each. From their
analysis emerge several fascinating points about how states have protected
nationals beyond their borders.110
The nature of the intervening states reveals two patterns: they have been al-
most exclusively Western, and there have been very few of them. Of the 16 epi-
sodes they describe, 13 involved the use of force by just four countries: the
United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium. Generally, these powers
have been the only ones in a position to effectively project military power in a
troubled region.111
The circumstances of the intervention have varied considerably. The num-
ber of endangered nationals has ranged from the thousands (in the Congo and
the Dominican Republic) to just two (in the Western Sahara). The govern-
mental situation has also varied, from the anarchy of no government at all (Li-
beria, the Dominican Republic) to a malevolent government actively
threatening the nationals concerned (Uganda, Iran). The nationality has like-
wise varied, from the rescue of own-country nationals (Entebbe, Mayaguez) to
the evacuation of all foreign nationals in a troubled area (the Congo, Liberia,
Grenada). Interestingly, almost all such operations have occurred in areas that
were, until the Charter era, under “Great Power” protection, usually as former
colonies. Iran, Palestine, Egypt, Cambodia, the Congo, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Lebanon, Uganda, the Western Sahara, Grenada, Panama—all were under
varying degrees of Great Power control until recently. This resulted in two situ-
ations: the turbulence which often accompanies recent independence, and a
power which is both familiar with and, in a moral sense, responsible for, the for-
mer territory.112
The scope of the intervention ran the gamut from brief excursions measured
in minutes (Entebbe, Mayaguez) to months-long stays (the Dominican Repub-
lic, Egypt). The longer-term operations, however, were only initially character-
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ized as the protection of nationals abroad. Once that phase of the operation
had passed, new missions with new justifications took their place. The true pro-
tective missions were extremely limited in the territorial scope, temporal dura-
tion, and military intensity of their effects.113
Finally, the state justifications for the interventions varied as well. Most
states have relied on multiple rationales for their operations, with the protec-
tion of nationals near the top of the list in most cases. However, as operations
lengthened or diversified, new justifications would be advanced once the na-
tionals sought to be protected were secure.114
A Coherent Legal Model for the Protection of Nationals Abroad
The four subtheories advanced by the counter-restrictionists each contain
helpful elements. A model which includes the most authoritative portions of all
four would provide a solid legal basis for undertaking such operations in the
Charter era.115
The first subtheory, regarding the survival or revival of the customary
norm allowing protection of nationals, is perhaps best understood as a synthe-
sis of the two. To the extent that such an understanding does not run afoul of
the plain language of the Charter, it appears that a narrowly construed form
of self-defense did survive the entry into force of the Charter, and that a long
line of customary international law informs its use today. The second portion
of this argument, however, is the more controversial. To the extent that the
UN did not deliver on the security it promised in return for a limitation on the
national exercise of self-defense, that inherent right must necessarily expand
to meet the new threats. Without violating the plain meaning of the Charter,
nations should and must protect their citizens when no another authority,
national or international, is willing or able. In this sense, this additional por-
tion of the inherent right of self-defense has been revived as the UN has often
proved incapable, as an organization, of maintaining international peace and
security.
The second subtheory, that such actions are below the qualitative threshold
of Article 2(4), is a close call, but, in the case of a pure rescue operation, in ac-
cord with the facts. If no territory is held, and if the political structure is not ma-
terially threatened, it is difficult to argue that a rescue operation breaks the
2(4) threshold.
The third subtheory, that such operations are lawful exercises of the inher-
ent right of self-defense, guaranteed by Article 51, is perhaps the strongest ar-
gument. By allowing the threshold of an “armed attack” to float at the level of
the provocation, a militarily necessary, proportionate, and chivalrous response
Conclusion
249
T:\Academic\Blue Book\Lillich\Ventura Files\Lillich Blue Book Vol 77.vp
Monday, July 29, 2002 10:55:15 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
will guarantee compliance with international law. If a single citizen is placed in
harm’s way, and only that force necessary to bring her to safety is employed,
then the protecting nation has gained no military advantage over the threaten-
ing nation, the status quo is maintained, and international peace and security
are preserved. Again, it is difficult to see how such an outcome violates the ob-
ject and purpose of the Charter, or the intentions of its framers.
Finally, the fourth subtheory argues for the equality of human rights with in-
ternational peace and security. Since the framing of the Charter, we have
learned more and more about the nature of regimes which threaten interna-
tional peace and security. None of these governments have the requisite re-
spect for the individual which is the basis for civil protections against tyranny.
Far from being in tension with international peace and security, human rights
are very much the foundation of international peace and security. A reading of
the Charter which places these two concepts in opposition is, consciously or
not, of greater service to the Benito Mussolinis of history than the Theodore
Roosevelts.
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67. 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (1976), quoted in Richard B.
Lillich, Introduction to Volume II: The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General International
Legal Issues, in RICHARD B. LILLICH AND JOHN NORTON MOORE EDS, U.S. NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE INTERNATIONAl LAW STUDIES: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, VOL. 62, IX, XI (1980) [hereinafter Introduction].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 38.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 40.
74. Id. at 40-41.
75. Id. at 41.
76. Id. at 44.
77. Id. This Presidential Statement places an unusual emphasis on feelings. The author was
present at a White House conversation, when a participant in the rescue mission was asked if he
would have killed the Iranian “student” guarding the three Americans he had been assigned to
recover. “Let’s just say,” replied the commando, “that meeting me would have been a significant
emotional event in his life.” Notes of conversation on file with the author.
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78. Id. at 45. Ronzitti provides an excellent explanation:
[Under Reisman’s theory,] [t]he Charter does not abrogate a State’s right to resort to
self-help, including the use of armed force, which belongs to it under customary
international law. The Charter simply suspends the right to resort to self-help, since it
entrusts the Security Council with the task of safeguarding the rights of member
States. Whenever this mechanism does not function, for example when the action of
the Security Council is paralysed by veto, the States are free to resort to self-help,
under the terms permitted by customary international law.
Id.
79. Id. at 46.
80. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 101. See generally John Norton Moore, Grenada and
the International Double Standard, 78 A. J. I. L. 145 (1984) and Ronald M. Riggs, The Grenada
Intervention: A Legal Analysis, 109 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
81. Moore, supra note 80, at 148 and 159-61. Moore explains:
Constitutional niceties of internal authority are difficult to construct when the only
general Constitution of a nation has been previously suspended in express violation of
its provisions and a subsequent attempted coup has announced the dissolution of the
Government that suspended the Constitution but was unable to consolidate effective
power. It does seem clear in this setting, however, that the authority of the
Governor-General to represent Grenada was stronger than that of anyone else.
Id. at 159.
82. Id. at 147-48.
83. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 101. President Reagan reported that the
condemnatory General Assembly vote had not “upset my breakfast at all.” Id.
84. Moore, supra note 80, at 151-53. Moore quotes the results of a CBS News poll,
conducted on November 6th: 62% felt the Americans had come “to save the lives of Americans
living here,” 65% said they believed the airport under construction was being built for Cuban and
Soviet military purposes, 76% stated they believed Cuba wanted to take control of the
Grenadian government, 81% said the American troops were “courteous and considerate,” 85%
stated they felt they or their family were in danger while General Austin was in power, 85% said
they felt the American purpose in invading was to “free the people of Grenada from the Cubans,”
and 91% were “glad the Americans came to Grenada.” Id. at 152.
85. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 93. Professor Lillich recommended the following
additional sources on the invasion of Panama:
Compare Abraham Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, in:
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 281, with
Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation,
in: Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 293.
See also Anthony D’Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to
Tyranny, in AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 516; Tom Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter
Paradigm, in: AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 503; Ved Nanda, The Validity of the United States
Intervention in Panama Under International Law, in: AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 494; John
Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, in: Yale JIL, vol. 15,
1990, 276; James P. Terry, The Panama Intervention: Law in Support of Policy, in:
Naval War College Review, vol. 43, 1990, no. 4, 110; Panel, The Panama Revolution,
in: American Society of International Law Proceedings (ASIL Proc.), vol. 84, 1990,
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182; Recent Developments, International Intervention—The United States Invasion
of Panama, in: Harvard International Law Journal (Harv. ILJ), vol. 31, 1990, 633.
Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian “Incident” of
1990, 35 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205, 206 (1993)
[hereinafter Liberia].
86. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 102.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. Included in the evacuated were French, Canadian, Italian, Lebanese, and even Iraqi
citizens. Id.
95. Id. at 102-103. For a more in-depth treatment of the incident, see Richard B. Lillich,
Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Liberian “Incident” of 1990, 35 GERMAN
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (1993). Lillich, supra note 85, at 205.
96. Lillich, Liberia, supra note 85, at 222-23.
97. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 105. See also Riggs, supra note 80, at 22.
98. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 106.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 107.
101. Id. Reisman himself continues: “A rational and contemporary interpretation of the
Charter must conclude that Article 2(4) suppresses self-help [only] insofar as the organization
can assume the role of enforcer.” When the UN fails in its mission “self-help prerogatives revive.”
[footnote omitted]. Any interpretation which fails to take this into account would merely
provide “an invitation to lawbreakers who would anticipate a paralysis in the Security Council’s
decision dynamics.” Michael Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, in C. Black and R. Falk (eds),
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 3: 850 (1971), quoted in AREND AND
BECK, supra note 4, at 107-08.
102. Professor McDougal summarized this position eloquently:
[T]he first important fact is that the machinery for collective police action
projected by the Charter has never been implemented. We don’t have the police
forces for the United Nations, the collective machinery that was expected to replace
self-help. In other words, there has been a failure in certain of the major provisions for
implementing the Charter.
If, in the light of this failure, we consider how we can implement the principal
purposes of minimizing coercion, of insuring that states do not profit by coercion and
violence, I submit to you that it is simply to honor lawlessness to hold that the
members of one state can, with impunity, attack the nationals—individuals, ships,
aircraft or other assets—of other states without any fear of response. In the absence of
collective machinery to protect against attack and deprivation, I would suggest that
the principle of major purpose requires an interpretation which would honor self-help
against prior unlawfulness. The principle of subsequent conduct would certainly
confirm this. . . .
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Myers McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, 20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 19,
28-29 (Dec. 1967), quoted in Lillich, Introduction, supra note 67, at XI.
103. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 108.
104. But see RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 8-9.
105. Riggs, supra note 80, at 24.
106. Ronzitti acknowledges the problem of assuming that an “armed attack” can involve only
aggressive international war:
[P]ractice shows that, when a State intends to wrongfully use armed coercion, it does
so in one of two ways: i) by using force against the territory of another State, or ii) by
exerting armed coercion within its own territory against foreign instrumentalities (e.g.
embassies) or citizens (individuals or State organs, such as foreign representatives).
Whereas in the former case the victim may react in self-defence, in the latter this is
not possible, since it is declared that there has been no ‘armed attack’.
RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 66. He continues:
[I]n recent years, particularly unpleasant episodes have repeatedly occurred, such as
the taking of hostages, and transnational terrorism. These events are the cause of a
continual state of danger. Unless the international community acquires suitable
instruments, capable of preventing and representing [sic] such criminal events,
resorting to unilateral armed force is likely to continue to increase on the part of those
States whose nationals become the victims of terrorist attacks, in order to fill the
vacuum created by the lack of effective control mechanisms.
Id.
107. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. See also Riggs, supra note 80, at 23.
108. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. Arend and Beck summarize McDougal and
Reisman’s position:
The Preamble’s “repeated emphasis upon the common interests in human rights,”
argue Reisman and McDougal, “indicates that the use of force for the urgent
protection of such rights is no less authorized than other forms of self-help,” [footnote
omitted] Under Article 1(3), they suggest, “promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights” is set out as a fundamental purpose of the United Nations. [footnote
omitted] Similarly, Article 55 of the Charter points to the UN objective of promoting
“human rights” observance, while Article 56 authorizes “joint and separate action [by
Members] in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set out in Article 55.” [footnote omitted]
Id.
109. Id. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. See also RONZITTI, supra note 5, at 2.
110. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 103.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 103-04.
113. Id. at 104.
114. Id.
115. Riggs, supra note 80, at 25-33.
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